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Abstract
Many connections have been established between learning and logic, or learning and topology, or logic and topology. Still, the
connections are not at the heart of these ﬁelds. Each of them is fairly independent of the others when attention is restricted to basic
notions and main results.We show that connections can actually be made at a fundamental level, and result in a logic with parameters
that needs topological notions for its early developments, and notions from learning theory for interpretation and applicability.
One of the key properties of ﬁrst-order logic is that the classical notion of logical consequence is compact. We generalize the
notion of logical consequence, and we generalize compactness to -weak compactness where  is an ordinal. The effect is to stratify
the set of generalized logical consequences of a theory into levels, and levels into layers. Deduction corresponds to the lower layer
of the ﬁrst level above the underlying theory, learning with less than  mind changes to layer  of the ﬁrst level, and learning in the
limit to the ﬁrst layer of the second level. Reﬁnements of Borel-like hierarchies provide the topological tools needed to develop the
framework.
© 2005 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
There is an immediate similarity between the compactness theorem of ﬁrst-order logic and ﬁnite learning. Indeed,
let T be a (possibly inﬁnite) ﬁrst-order theory and let  be a ﬁrst-order formula. If  is a logical consequence of T ,
then  is a logical consequence of a ﬁnite subset of T , which means that if all members of T are enumerated then
after some ﬁnite time, a learner can discover that T  and will not have to change its mind. This simple observation
could have initiated a common destiny for logic and learning, but the story of their developments is different. Finite
learning is hardly considered as learning, and learning theory thrived over more complex criteria of learnability. On
the other hand, classical ﬁrst-order logic promoted the view that the compactness theorem signiﬁcantly accounts for
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its successfulness. So the analogy between the compactness theorem and ﬁnite learning seems more like a case for an
early divorce than for a natural union of logic and learning.
The idea of a logic of induction has had advocates before formal deductive logic was invented, even if the term
‘logic’ applied to induction could either mean a framework that closely follows the line of deductive logic—deﬁne a
syntax, a semantics and a proof theory—or a framework based on probability theory, hence quite different in nature
from Frege’s creation. In any case, a ‘logic of induction’ is generally opposed to deductive logic: for instance, the
former should be based on nonmonotonic forms of reasoning [14] contrary to the latter. But is there a natural formal
system that would encompass both deduction and induction? Such a system or paradigmPwould be based on a notion
of generalized logical consequence that would not be compact. We would identify the ‘deductive consequences’ (w.r.t.
P) of a theory T with the generalized logical consequences of T that enjoy the compactness property. And we could
hope that a weaker form of compactness would be the hallmark of the ‘inductive consequences’ (w.r.t. P) of T [18].
As will be seen, this idea can be reﬁned and yield a notion of ‘-weak compactness’ that has a natural interpretation in
terms of learning with less than  mind changes [2,7,10,24]. Such a correspondence is appealing, and not just because
the notion of -weak compactness is formally simple. It can also provide characterizations of the hypotheses that can
be learned with less than  mind changes, and is related to what is known in topology as the difference hierarchy [11].
This kind of characterization has been obtained when  is an integer [6], together with other results that relate various
learning paradigms derived from [9] to some topological spaces [13,20,21,23]. For instance, it has been pointed out
that learnability in the limit can be related to being 2 in the Borel hierarchy deﬁned over some topological space
[8,23]. We will reestablish and extend these connections in a more systematic and general setting (in particular, for an
arbitrary set of possible data), where logic, topology and learning are interrelated.
We proceed as follows. After ﬁxing some notation in Section 2, we describe the fundamental model-theoretic
notions of Parametric logic in Section 3: the parameters, the generalized notion of logical consequence, and the
logical hierarchies. In Section 4, we deﬁne a natural topological space from some of the parameters introduced in
Section 3. Considering the Borel and the difference hierarchies over this topological space, and then the closed formulas
that hereditarily represent members of these hierarchies, we establish fundamental connections between logical and
topological complexity. In Section 5, basic concepts from Inductive inference are redeﬁned in the logical setting, and
classiﬁcation in the limit, with or without a mind change bound, is shown to be related in an essential way to the logical
and topological concepts. We conclude in Section 6.
2. General notation
We ﬁrst introduce some general notation. The class of ordinals is denoted by Ord. Given , , ′, ′ ∈ Ord, we write
(, ) < (′, ′) iff (, ) is lexicographically before (′, ′), i.e., either  < ′, or  = ′ and  < ′.
Let a classX be given. The class of ﬁnite sequences of members ofX, including the empty sequence (), is represented
by X. Given a ﬁnite or an inﬁnite sequence  of members of X and a natural number i that, in case  is ﬁnite, is at
most equal to the length of , we represent by |i the initial segment of  of length i. Concatenation between sequences
is represented by , and sequences consisting of a unique element are often identiﬁed with that element. We write
⊂ (respect., ⊆) for strict (respect., nonstrict) inclusion between classes, as well as for the notion of a ﬁnite sequence
being a strict (respect., nonstrict) initial segment of another sequence. Let two sets X, Y and a partial function f from
X into Y be given. Given x ∈ X, we write f (x) =↓ when f (x) is deﬁned, and f (x) =↑ otherwise. Given two
members x, x′ of X, we write f (x) = f (x′) when both f (x) and f (x′) are deﬁned and equal; we write f (x) = f (x′)
otherwise.
Let R be a binary relation over a class X. Recall that R is well-founded iff for every nonempty set Y ⊆ X, Y contains
an element x such that no member y of Y satisﬁes R(y, x). Suppose that R is well-founded. We then denote by R the
unique function from X into Ord such that for all x ∈ X:
R(x) = sup{R(y) + 1 : y ∈ X, R(y, x)}.
The length of R is the least ordinal not in the range of R . Note that the length of R is equal to 0 iff X = ∅.
For example, Fig. 1 depicts a ﬁnite binary relation R of length 5. In this diagram, an arrow joins a point y to a point
x iff R(y, x) holds. For all points x in the ﬁeld of R, the value of R(x) is indicated.








Fig. 1. A ﬁnite binary relation of length 5.
3. Logical paradigms
3.1. The parameters of Parametric logic
Parametric logic is a uniﬁed family of logics, also called (logical) paradigms, deﬁned as particular settings for ﬁve
parameters.2 All fundamental notions are deﬁned independently of the values of the parameters. Classical ﬁrst-order
logic is a particular paradigm and some classical learning paradigms from Inductive inference, once cast in the current
framework, are other examples of logical paradigms. In this section, we deﬁne the ﬁve parameters.
The ﬁrst parameter of Parametric logic is a vocabulary, i.e., a set of predicate symbols and function symbols (constants
are 0-ary function symbols), possibly containing equality (we depart from the standard practice of including equality
in the logical part of the language).
Notation 1. We denote byV a countable vocabulary.
We refer toV-terms simply as terms. If we say thatV contains 0 and s, then 0 denotes a constant and s a unary
function symbol; moreover, given a nonnull n ∈ N, n is used as an abbreviation for the term obtained from 0 by n
applications of s to 0. We denote byLV the set of ﬁnite statements, i.e., well-formed expressions built fromV and
a countable set of (ﬁrst-order) variables using negation, disjunction and conjunction of (possibly empty) ﬁnite sets
of expressions, and quantiﬁcation.3 So for all ﬁnite D ⊆ LV, the disjunction of all members of D, written
∨
D,
and the conjunction of all members of D, written ∧D, both belong toLV. We denote byLV1 the extension of
LV that accepts disjunctions and conjunctions of countable sets of expressions. So for all countable X ⊆LV1, the
disjunction of all members of X, written ∨X, and the conjunction of all members of X, written ∧X, both belong
toLV1.
4 We refer to the members ofLV1 as inﬁnitary statements. Note that the occurrence or nonoccurrence of
= inV determines whetherLV andLV1 are languages with or without equality. Given an inﬁnitary statement ,
we identify
∨{} and∧{} with . Given two inﬁnitary statements 1 and 2, 1 ∨2 and 2 ∨1 are abbreviations
for
∨{1,2}, 1 ∧2 and 2 ∧1 are abbreviations for
∧{1,2}, 1 → 2 is an abbreviation for ¬1 ∨2, and
1 ↔ 2 is an abbreviation for (1 → 2) ∧ (2 → 1).
The natural sets of languages to be dealt with in this framework are countable fragments of the inﬁnitary logicL1
[15]. More precisely, a fragment ofLV1 is a subset L ofLV1 with the following properties: 5
• All members of L contain at most ﬁnitely many free variables.
2 In full generality, we deﬁne a paradigm as a set of six parameters. We do not include here one of the parameters, namely, a countable ordinal 
that represents the number of meta-levels above the object level at which reasoning can be formalized. In this paper,  takes the value 0 for the sake
of simplicity, and all notions are deﬁned at the object level. Still, most results hold for arbitrary values of .
3 We use the word ‘statement’ here because the ‘formulas’ of Parametric logic can be more general than the members ofLV: the ‘formulas’ of
Parametric logic are given by the second parameter.
4LV1 is a more natural extension ofL
V
 when disjunction and conjunction inLV are deﬁned as unary operators whose arguments are ﬁnite
sets, rather than being deﬁned as operators taking two statements as arguments. It also simpliﬁes many deﬁnitions and proofs.
5 It is usually assumed that a fragment ofLV1 is also closed under a syntactic operator ∼ that, when applied to a closed member  ofLV1,
yields a closed inﬁnitary statement that is logically equivalent to ¬. The ∼ operator plays a natural role in Parametric logic in relation to a notion
of syntactic complexity. In this paper, we can dispense with ∼ and do without it for simplicity.
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• All ﬁnite statements are in L.
• For all  ∈ L, variables x and terms t , [t/x] is in L.
• For all  ∈ L and variables x, ∃x and ∀x are in L.
• For all  ∈ L, ¬ is in L.
• For all ﬁnite D ⊆ L,∨D and∧D are in L.
• For all  ∈ L and substatements 	 of , 	 is in L.
For all setsX of closed members ofLV1, there exists a least fragment ofL
V
1 that containsX; we call it the fragment
ofLV1 generated by X. For all countable sets X of closed members ofL
V
1, the fragment ofL
V
1 generated by X
is countable. The second parameter of Parametric logic is the set of closed members of a countable fragment ofLV1.
Notation 2. We denote byL the set of closed members of a countable fragment ofLV1.6
We refer to the members ofL as sentences.
By structure, we mean V-structure. In Artiﬁcial intelligence and in Inductive inference, not every structure is an
intended interpretation. For example, the latter investigates the learnability of classes of languages, a language being
a recursively enumerable subset of N. If we choose forV a vocabulary that contains 0, s, a unary predicate P , and
possibly other predicate symbols, then a languageL can be represented as the structureMwhose domain is {n : n ∈ N},
such that for all n ∈ N,MP(n) iff n ∈ L, and such that the interpretation of all other predicate symbols inV is ﬁxed.
Such a structure is standard. More generally, given a structureM,M is Henkin iffM’s individuals are the nonempty
sets of closed terms that they interpret,M is Herbrand iffM is Henkin andM’s individuals are singletons, andM is
standard if either V contains equality and M is Henkin, or V is equality-free and M is Herbrand. By the previous
remark, the languages considered in Inductive inference are naturally represented as standard structures; in the resulting
logical paradigm, nonstandard structures are unintended interpretations. Though the class of intended interpretations
is often a set of standard structures, we make no a priori assumption and accept any set of structures as a potential set
of intended interpretations. This justiﬁes the introduction of the third parameter, together with a ﬁrst generalization of
the classical notion of logical consequence that will be used in the formal developments, though it is still a particular
case of the generalized notion of logical consequence we will deﬁne in the next section.
Notation 3. We denote byW a set of structures.7
Given T ⊆LV1, we denote by ModW(T ) the set of models of T inW.
Deﬁnition 4. Given T ⊆ LV1, an inﬁnitary statement  is said to be a logical consequence of T in W, written
T W, iff ModW(T ) ⊆ ModW().
Given ,	 ∈LV1, if ModW() = ModW(	) then we say that  is logically equivalent to 	 inW.
Members of W will be referred to as possible worlds. Consider a learning paradigm where the set L of even
numbers is one of the languages to be learnt. When learning from positive data only, a learner has to converge in
the limit to an r.e. index for L, on any enumeration of L (such an enumeration is a text for L). Cast in the current
framework, an enumeration of L becomes an enumeration of T = {P(2n) : n ∈ N}, and an r.e. index for L becomes
a sentence  that uniquely characterizes the standard structureM that represents the set of even numbers, among the
set of intended interpretations. So  has the property that ModW() = {M}, and could be for instance the sentence
 = P(0) ∧ ∀x(P (x) ↔ ¬P(s(x))). One of our aims is to relate identiﬁcation in the limit to some notion of logical
inference, in such a way that learning can be seen as a particular way of drawing logical inferences w.r.t. the notion
that has been chosen. Applied to the previous example, this requirement translates to: the sentence  above should be,
6 When a countable ordinal  is introduced as a sixth parameter, a notion of inﬁnitary -modal statement is deﬁned, and L denotes the set of
closed members of a countable fragment of the set of inﬁnitary -modal statements.
7 When a countable ordinal  is introduced as a sixth parameter, a notion of -aggregative structure is deﬁned, andW is replaced by a set of
-aggregative structures. The requirement thatW cannot be a proper class is meant to simplify the deﬁnition of further concepts. For example, we
will deﬁne a topology overW; ifW could be a proper class, then we would have to modify the usual treatment of topological spaces over sets. That
would be an unworthy complication, because having to assume thatW is a set is not really restrictive. The Löwenheim–Skolem theorem enables to
take forW the set of all countable structures, without affecting the semantics deﬁned on the basis of the class of all structures.
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in some sense, a logical consequence of the set T above. Obviously,  is not a logical consequence of T in the usual
sense. It is not even the case that  is a logical consequence of T inW. Remember that a text for the set L of even
numbers is an enumeration of all members of L: the nonoccurrence of 3 in any text for L tacitly implies that 3 is not a
member of L. This tacit assumption on texts for L is lost when considering T , which can be expanded with ¬P(3) as
well as with P(3). This is the reason why it is not the case that every model of T inW is a model of . Taken alone,
the parameterW does not offer enough ﬂexibility; more generality is needed. To solve this issue, a fourth parameter
is introduced to represent the sentences that can be used as data.
Notation 5. We denote by D a set of sentences.
We refer to a member ofD as a possible datum. With the previous example,Dwould take the value {P(n) : n ∈ N}.
If we considered learning from both positive and negative data instead of learning from positive data, hence if we
considered informants instead of texts, we would instead deﬁneD as {P(n),¬P(n) : n ∈ N} (as done in [17]). In full
generality, D is an arbitrary set of sentences.
Classical ﬁrst-order logic, being purely hypothetico-deductive, has no notion of data, which amounts to settingD to
∅. But every set A of sentences can be the starting point for logical investigation: A can be interpreted as assumptions,
axioms, or explicit knowledge on the basis of which inferences can be drawn. On the other hand, paradigms from
Inductive inference, once cast in this framework, are perfectly determined byW andD, and have no notion of explicit
knowledge. Between these extreme cases, it is common in Inductive logic programming to deal with sets of sentences
consisting of both data and background knowledge, consisting of sentences of a given kind, for instance, deﬁnite Horn
clauses [19]. A ﬁfth parameter is needed to represent the sentences that can play the role of pieces of information not
conveyed by data.
Notation 6. We denote byA a set of sentences.
We refer to a member ofA as a possible assumption. As pointed out, casting Inductive inference into this framework
usually requires to take for A the empty set, whereas classical ﬁrst-order logic takes for A the set of closed ﬁnite
statements (which, in this case, is also the value of L). It could be assumed that D and A are disjoint sets, or that
D is a subset of A, without affecting the formal developments in any signiﬁcant way. We prefer not to impose any
relationship between D andA.
We have deﬁned all parameters.
Notation 7. The quintuple (V,L,W,D,A) is denoted P.
In the formal developments,P refers to the class of logical paradigms or to the logical paradigm under investigation,
depending on which assumptions are made on its members: some results place no condition on P, while other results
impose some conditions onP, the extreme case being when all members ofP have to take particular values so thatP
refers to a unique paradigm. Classical ﬁrst-order logic is the particular case whereV is arbitrary,L is the set of closed
members ofLV,W is the set of all countable structures, D = ∅, andA = L. We have pointed out that learning
paradigms can be cast in the current framework and result in other particular cases.
3.2. Generalized logical consequence
The notion of logical consequence we are after is not captured by the notion of logical consequence inW deﬁned in
Deﬁnition 4. It cannot be determined by the parameterW alone; but it can be naturally deﬁned fromW andD.We ﬁrst
introduce a technical concept. Given a structureM, theD-diagram of M, denoted DiagD(M), is the set of all members
of D that are true inM [12]. When Inductive inference is cast in this framework, a learner is basically presented with
an enumeration of DiagD(M) for some possible worldM, andM is perfectly determined by itsD-diagram among the
members ofW, in the same way that a language L is perfectly determined by a text for L, in the class of languages
to be learnt:M is the only intended model of DiagD(M). More generally, the intended models of an arbitrary set T of
inﬁnitary statements are deﬁned as follows.
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Deﬁnition 8. Let a set T of inﬁnitary statements be given.
AD-minimal model of T inW is a structureM such thatM ∈ ModW(T ) and for allN ∈ ModW(T ), DiagD(N) ⊂
DiagD(M).
We denote by ModDW(T ) the set of D-minimal models of T inW.
Going back to our running example, remember that T = {P(2n) : n ∈ N} is not by itself the proper counterpart
to a text for the language L consisting of the even natural numbers: in an intended model of T , P(3) should be false,
as a counterpart to the fact that 3 belongs to N \ L. On the other hand, together withW and D, T can be seen as a
counterpart to L because all sentences of the form P(2n + 1), n ∈ N, are false in allD-minimal models of T inW: the
set ofD-minimal models of T inW is arguably the set of intended models of T . Note how Deﬁnition 8 generalizes the
notion of minimal Herbrand model of a set of deﬁnite clauses:W is then assumed to be the set of Herbrand structures,
whileD is supposed to be the set of closed atomic sentences [5]. In the general case, sinceW andD are arbitrary, a set
of inﬁnitary statements can have a unique D-minimal model inW, many of them, or none at all. We can now deﬁne
the notion of generalized logical consequence determined by the parameters of a paradigm, on the basis of the claim
that the set of D-minimal models of a set T of inﬁnitary statements is the class of intended models of T .
Deﬁnition 9. Let a set T of inﬁnitary statements be given.
An inﬁnitary statement  is said to be aD-minimal logical consequence of T inW, written T DW, iff ModDW(T )⊆ ModW().
When T ⊆L we let CnDW(T ) = { ∈L : T DW}.
Deﬁnition 9 is not only appropriate to model learning scenarios; it also provides a natural formalization for many
of the nonclassical forms of reasoning investigated in Artiﬁcial intelligence, and as pointed out, it is also related to a
fundamental notion from logic programming.
A key feature of the framework is to study the relation T DW for speciﬁc subsets ofL.WhenP captures a learning
paradigm, the only subsets T of L we are interested in are the D-diagrams of the members ofW. More generally,
by our interpretation of D as the set of possible data, it is natural to assume that all theories of interest contain the
D-diagram of a possible world. By our interpretation ofA as the set of possible assumptions, all theories of interest
should be subsets ofD∪A. Finally, if we restrict investigations to theories that have at least one intended model, i.e.,
at least one D-minimal model inW, we are led to the following notation.
Notation 10. B denotes {DiagD(M) ∪ A :M ∈ ModW(A), A ⊆A}.
We refer to a member ofB as a possible knowledge base. The members ofB are the theories that are the legitimate
starting points for logical investigation. In caseP is the paradigm of classical ﬁrst-order logic,B is nothing but the set
of consistent theories (i.e., consistent sets of closed ﬁnite statements).
We close this section with a generalization of a classical logical notion that will be used repeatedly.
Deﬁnition 11. Given a subset T ofLV1 and a closed member  ofL
V
1, we say that T D-minimally decides  in
W iff either T DW or T DW¬.
3.3. Logical hierarchies
In this section, we deﬁne a model-theoretic measure of complexity for the notion ofD-minimal logical consequence
inW; such a measure results, for every possible knowledge base T , in a hierarchy of members of CnDW(T ). A ﬁrst
observation is that the notion T DW, where T varies over B and where  varies over L, is usually not compact:
for most settings of the parameters in P, it is possible to have T DW though there does not necessarily exist a ﬁnite
subset K of T such that ModW(K) ⊆ ModW().We claim that compactness is the hallmark of deduction, in the sense
that  can be described as aD-minimal deductive consequence of T inW just in case  is a member of CnDW(T ) such
that the compactness property holds. When P is the paradigm of classical ﬁrst-order logic, the compactness theorem
implies that ‘D-minimal logical consequence in W’ and ‘D-minimal deductive consequence in W’ are equivalent
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notions, equivalent to the classical notion of logical consequence. In the general case, given T ∈ B, the hierarchy of
D-minimal logical consequence of T inW is deﬁned in such a way that its ﬁrst layer (over T ) consists precisely of
the D-minimal deductive (compact) consequence of T inW. So in the particular case of classical ﬁrst-order logic,
hierarchies have one layer only.
Given T ∈ B, the second layer of the hierarchy ofD-minimal logical consequence of T inW can be described as the
set of D-minimal inductive consequences of T inW. What is meant by inductive is a property of weak compactness,
or compactness weakened with a notion of ‘refutability’ [22]. Let T ∈ B and  ∈ CnDW(T ) be given. Suppose that
there exists a ﬁnite subset K of T such that for all possible knowledge bases T ′ that contain K , either the sentence 
is a D-minimal logical consequence of T ′ inW, or the negation of  is a D-minimal deductive consequence of T ′ in
W. It is then legitimate, on the basis of K , to induce  since in case  is not true in some intended model of a possible
knowledge base T ′ that contains K , then a ﬁnite subset of T ′ will eventually enable to conclusively refute .
The compactness property and the weak compactness property can both be generalized to a property of -weak
compactness, where  is an ordinal, the former being the case  = 0, the latter being the case  = 1. Given a possible
knowledge base T , layer  of the hierarchy built over T will consist of the members of CnDW(T ) that satisfy the property
of -weak compactness. The property of -weak compactness essentially states that on the basis of a ﬁnite subset K
of T , it is legitimate to infer  because for all possible knowledge bases T ′, the following holds. Assume that K is a
subset of T ′, but that  is not a D-minimal logical consequence of T ′ inW. Then T ′ can D-minimally -refute  in
W, in the sense that the negation of  occurs in the hierarchy over T ′ below layer .
We have roughly described the layers that make up the ﬁrst level of the hierarchy built over some possible knowledge
base.8 Reiterating the process will create other levels above the ﬁrst level, indexed by an ordinal  greater than 1,
partitioned into layers indexed by an ordinal . The hierarchies ofD-minimal logical consequences inW of a possible
knowledge base are formally deﬁned next. Note that from level 2 onwards, the property of -weak compactness is
applied to a ﬁnite set of sentences for which, in the general case, we have to know a bit more than the mere fact that
all of its members have been already put on a lower level of the hierarchy being built: for a given possible knowledge
base T , it is necessary to be able to distinguish between members of CnDW(T ) that do belong to T , and members of
CnDW(T ) that only possibly belong to T .
Deﬁnition 12. Let ,  ∈ Ord with  = 0 be given, and suppose that 
P
′,′(T
′) has been deﬁned for all ′ ′ ∈ Ord
with ′ = 0 and (′, ′) < (, ), and for all T ′ ∈ B. Let a possible knowledge base T be given. We deﬁne 
P,(T )






such that for all T ′ ∈ B 9 :





′) then  ∈ CnDW(T ′).
In the previous deﬁnition,  is intuitively put on layer  of level  of the hierarchy over T , on the basis of the sets K
and H , thanks to the property of -weak compactness formalized as (). For technical purposes, we need to keep track
of the sets K and H that enable to place  in the hierarchy over T . The next notation is introduced for this purpose.
Notation 13. We denote by d the class of tuples of the form (K,H, , ,) where ,  are ordinals with  = 0, K,H
are ﬁnite subsets ofL, and  is a member ofL such that for all T ∈ B:




P,′(T ) then  ∈ CnDW(T ).
8 Levels are indexed by nonnull ordinals, whereas the layers of a given level are indexed by ordinals including 0. The difference in the indexing
will ﬁnd its formal justiﬁcation when we establish connections with the Borel and the difference hierarchies.
9 In versions of the framework where the ∼ operator discussed in Footnote 4 is introduced, we write ∼  rather than ¬, because ∼∼  is
syntactically identical with , and better reﬂects the intuition behind the property of -weak compactness: alternate between believing in  and
believing in ∼ , with greater and greater degree of belief, rather than believe in , then believe in ¬, then believe in ¬¬, then believe in
¬¬¬…with greater and greater degree of belief.
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Note how the logical hierarchies can be deﬁned in terms of d:
Property 14. For all ,  ∈ Ord with  = 0 and for all T ∈ B, 
P,(T ) is the set of all  ∈ CnDW(T ) for which there
exists a ﬁnite K ⊆ T and a ﬁnite H ⊆⋃(′,′)<(,0) 
P′,′(T ) with (K,H, , ,) ∈ d.
We will use the straightforward property below that compares pairs of hierarchies for two related paradigms that
share the same vocabulary, the same language and the same set of possible data, but such that one of the paradigms has
more possible worlds and more possible assumptions than the other.
Property 15. LetW′ ⊆ W andA′ ⊆ A be given. Denote by P′ the paradigm (V,L,W′,D,A′). Let M ∈ W′
and A ⊆A′ withMA be given, and deﬁne T = DiagD(M)∪A. For all ,  ∈ Ord with  = 0,




Together with the Löwenheim–Skolem theorem, the compactness property of ﬁrst-order logic implies that in the
particular case whereL is the set of closed members ofLS,W is the set of all countable structures, D = ∅, and
A =L then for all T ∈ B, 
P1,0(T ) is equal to CnDW(T ), which is nothing but { ∈L : T }.
The logical, model-theoretic complexity (in P) of a sentence is naturally deﬁned as follows.
Deﬁnition 16. Let nonnull ordinals ,  and a sentence  be given.
We say that isP, just in case for all T ∈ B, if is aD-minimal logical consequence of T inW, then ∈ 
P,(T )
for some ordinal  < .
We say that  is P, iff ¬ is P,.





We say that  is P | P | P  if it is P,1 | P,1 | P,1.
The following property can immediately be derived from Deﬁnitions 12 and 16. We will use it in the case  = 1
when we relate the logical hierarchies to classiﬁcation with less than  mind changes.
Property 17. For all nonnull ,  ∈ Ord and ∈L, is P, |P, iff there exists a subsetB′ ofB and a sequence
(T )T ∈B′ of ordinals smaller than  with the following property:
• Every member of B′ D-minimally decides  inW.
• B′ contains all T ∈ B such that T DW | T DW¬.
• For all T ∈ B′, there exists K ⊆ T and H ⊆ ⋃(′,′)<(,0) 
P′,′(T ) such that for all T ′ ∈ B with K ⊆ T ′ and
H ⊆ CnDW(T ′), T ′ ∈ B′ and:
 ∈ CnDW(T ′) iff  ∈ CnDW(T ) whenever T T ′ .
Corollary 18. Let nonnull ,  ∈ Ord and ∈L be given. LetB′ be the set of members ofB thatD-minimally decide
 inW. Then  is P, iff there exists a sequence (T )T ∈B′ of ordinals smaller than  with the following property.
For all T ∈ B′, there exists K ⊆ T and H ⊆ ⋃(′,′)<(,0) 
P′,′(T ) such that for all T ′ ∈ B with K ⊆ T ′ and
H ⊆ CnDW(T ′), T ′ ∈ B′ and:
 ∈ CnDW(T ′) iff  ∈ CnDW(T ) whenever T T ′ .
3.4. Derivations
This section introduces technical notions and lemmas that will be needed to prove the main results of the paper.
In particular, we need to show that it is possible to modify the property of -weak compactness expressed as () in
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The basic idea is not to consider all possible knowledge bases T ′ such that all members of H are D-minimal logical
consequences of T ′ inW, but only those possible knowledge bases T ′ such that all members of H have already been
derived and put in the hierarchy built over T ′ below level . The last result in this section shows that if, in Deﬁnition 12,






′),’ then the logical hierarchies remain unaffected. It will
be derived from a still stronger alternative to the property of -weak compactness. Basically, we can make sure that it
is possible to trace in H how each member 	 of H can be derived, on the basis of a ﬁnite subset H	 of H such that
each member of H	 either belongs to T or occurs in the hierarchy over T below the level on which 	 occurs. This
amounts to a stronger property of -weak compactness, that still deﬁnes the same logical hierarchies. We now deﬁne
the notions needed to state the results that have just been introduced.
Deﬁnition 19. A trace is a sequence of the form
(K, (1, 1, H1), . . . , (i , i , Hi)),
where i ∈ N, K is a ﬁnite set of sentences, H1, . . . , Hi are nonempty, ﬁnite sets of sentences, 1, . . . , i are nonnull
ordinals and 1, . . . , i are ordinals such that for all nonnull j < i, (j , j ) < (j+1, j+1).
The height bound of a trace of the form (K) is equal to 0. The height bound of a trace that ends with a triple of the
form (, , H) is equal to (, ).
When a trace contains a member of the form (, , {}), this member is usually represented by (, ,).
Deﬁnition 20. A derivation is a trace of the form   ((, ,)) where  is a trace whose height bound is smaller than
(, 0)—with the convention that 0 is smaller than (, 0).
A derivation of the form   ((, ,)) is said to be a derivation of .
Deﬁnition 21. Given T ∈ B , a trace (K, (1, 1, H1), . . . , (i , i , Hi)) is said to be from T (inP) just in case K ⊆ T
and
⋃
0<j i Hj ⊆ CnDW(T ).
As a counterpart to d, introduced in Notation 13 as a means to describe the logical hierarchies, we now deﬁne a set
D as a means to describe hierarchies based on the alternative notion of -weak compactness discussed at the beginning
of the section.
Notation 22. LetD be the (unique) class of derivations that satisﬁes the following conditions. Let  ∈L, ,  ∈ Ord
with  = 0, and a trace  whose height bound is smaller than (, 0) be given. Assume that for all members of  of the
form (′, ′, H) and for all 	 ∈ H , if  is the longest initial segment of  whose height bound is smaller than (′, 0),
then   ((′, ′,	)) ∈ D. Then   ((, ,)) belongs to D iff the following holds. For all possible knowledge bases
T , if  is from T and  /∈ CnDW(T ), then D contains a derivation of ¬ from T whose height bound is at least equal
to (, 0) and smaller than (, ).
The following lemma parallels Property 14. It is an interesting result in its own right, but the main reason to include
it here is that it is an essential technical tool for the proof of more fundamental results.
Lemma 23. Given T ∈ B, ,  ∈ Ord with  = 0 and  ∈L,  belongs to 
P,(T ) iff there exists a derivation of 
from T in D whose height bound is (, ) at most.
Proof. Given a nonnull  ∈ Ord,  ∈ Ord, a ﬁnite K ⊆ L, a ﬁnite H ⊆ L,  ∈ L, and a derivation  =
(E, (1, 1, H1), . . . , (i , i , Hi), (i+1, i+1,	)), say that (K,H, , ,) is a projection of  iff  = 	,  = i+1,
 = i+1,K = E andH =
⋃
0<j i Hi . LetX be the set of quintuples of the form (K,H, , ,) that are the projection
of some member ofD. Let nonnull  ∈ Ord and  ∈ Ord be given, and suppose that for all (K,H, ′, ′,) ∈ X with
(′, ′) < (, 0), (K,H, ′, ′,) ∈ d. Let  = (K,H, , ,) ∈ X and T ∈ B be such that K ⊆ T , H ⊆ CnDW(T )
and  /∈ CnDW(T ). Choose a derivation of the form   ((, ,)) in X which  is a projection of. Note that  is from
T . Then D contains a derivation of ¬ from T whose height bound is at least equal to (, 0) and smaller than (, ),
112 É. Martin et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 350 (2006) 103–124
which by assumption implies that ¬ belongs to⋃′< 
P,′(T ). It follows immediately that  ∈ d. We conclude that
for all T ∈ B, if there exists a derivation of  from T in D whose height bound is (, ) at most, then  ∈ 
P,(T ).
Given two functional relations U and V deﬁned on B × (Ord \ {0}) × Ord ×L, we say that (U, V ) is a possible







be given. Then there exists a ﬁnite K ⊆ T , a k ∈ N and for all nonnull ik, a nonnull ordinal i < , an ordinal i
and a i ∈ 
Pi ,i (T ) \
⋃
(′,′)<(i ,i ) 

P
′,′(T ) such that
10
• (K, {1, . . . ,k}, , ,) ∈ d,
• U(T , , ,) = {(i , i ,i ) : 1 ik}, and
• V (T , , ,) = K .







be given. By induction on p, we deﬁne two families of sets, (Xhp(T , , , H))p∈N and (Y hp (T , , , H))p∈N. Let
Xh0 (T , , , H) = {(, ,) :  ∈ H } and Yh0 (T , , , H) = ∅. Let p ∈ N be given, and suppose that Xhp(T , , , H)
and Yhp (T , , , H) have been deﬁned. Deﬁne Xhp+1(T , , , H) as the union of Xhp(T , , , H) with all sets of the
form U(T , ′, ′,	), and Yhp+1(T , , , H) as the union of Yhp (T , , ,) with all sets of the form V (T , ′, 
′,	),
where (′, ′,	) varies over Xp(T , , , H). Let
• Xh(T , , , H) =⋃p∈N Xhp(T , , , H),
• Yh(T , , , H) =⋃p∈N Yhp (T , , , H).
Clearly, Xh(T , , , H) and Yh(T , , , H) are both ﬁnite sets. We denote by h(T , , , H) the (unique) trace with
both following properties. The ﬁrst member of h(T , , , H) is Yh(T , , , H). For all ′, ′ ∈ Ord and ﬁnite
H ′ ⊆ L, (′, ′, H ′) occurs in h(T , , , H) iff there exists a member of Xh(T , , , H) of the form (′, ′,),








h(T , , , {}) is a derivation of  from T .
Deﬁne Y as the set of all derivations that are of the form h(T , , , {}) where h is a possible history,  a nonnull






′,′(T ). Clearly, for






′,′(T ), there exists a derivation of  from T in Y whose
height bound is equal to (, ). Also, for all ,  ∈ Ord with  = 0, for all traces , for all  ∈ L, for all members
of  of the form (′, ′, H), and for all 	 ∈ H , if   ((, ,)) ∈ Y and  is the longest initial segment of  whose
height bound is smaller than (′, 0), then   ((′, ′,	)) ∈ Y . Let ordinals ,  with  > 0 be given, and suppose that
for all nonnull ′ ∈ Ord and ′ ∈ Ord with (′, ′) < (, ), for all traces , for all T ∈ B, and for all  ∈ L, if 
is from T ,  /∈ CnDW(T ) and   ((′, ′,)) belongs to Y , then Y contains a derivation of ¬ from T whose height
bound is at least equal to (′, 0) and smaller than (′, ′). Let a trace , T ∈ B, and  ∈L be such that   ((, ,))
belongs to Y ,  is from T ,  /∈ CnDW(T ), and   ((, ,)) belongs to Y . We can choose a possible history h such
that   ((, ,)) = h(T , , , {}), and it is easily veriﬁed that ¬ belongs to⋃′< 
P,′(T ). Hence Y contains a
derivation of ¬ from T whose height bound is at least equal to (, 0) and smaller than (, ). It follows immediately
that Y ⊆ D. We conclude that for all T ∈ B, if  ∈ 
P,(T ) then there exists a derivation of  from T in D whose
height bound is (, ) at most. This completes the proof of the lemma. 
The following application of Lemma 23 will also be used in the proofs of the main results.
Lemma 24. Let  ∈ Ord \ {0},  ∈ Ord, and T ∈ B be given. For all  ∈ 
P,(T ), there exists a ﬁnite K⊆T and
a ﬁnite H ⊆⋃(′,′)<(,0) 
P′,′(T ) such that (K,H, , ,) ∈ d and for all T ′ ∈ B, the following are equivalent:
• K ⊆ T ′ and H ⊆ CnDW(T ′),
• K ⊆ T ′ and H ⊆⋃(′,′)<(,0) 
P′,′(T ′).
10 Since U and V are proper classes, ‘U(x1, x2, x3, x4) = x5’ should be read as an abbreviation for ‘(x1, x2, x3, x4, x5) belongs to the ﬁeld of U ,’
and similarly for V .
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′,′(T ). By Lemma 23, given  ∈ H , we can choose a derivation  of  from T in D, such that the height bound
of  is smaller than (, 0). For all members  of H , let K denote the ﬁrst member of . Let K ′ = K ∪
⋃
∈H K.
Let H ′ be the set of all 	 ∈ L for which there exists  ∈ H such that  contains a triple of the form (′, ′, H ′′)
with 	 ∈ H ′′. Note that K ⊆ K ′ and H ⊆ H ′, which implies that (K ′, H ′, , ,) ∈ d. Also note that K ′ ⊆ T and
H ′ ⊆ ⋃(′,′)<(,0) 
P′,′(T ). Moreover, it is easy to verify that for all possible knowledge bases T ′, K ′ ⊆ T ′ and






′). The lemma follows immediately. 
4. Connections with topology
4.1. Topology hierarchies
Our aimnow is to show that the logical hierarchies are fundamentally related to theBorel and the difference hierarchies
over a natural topological space deﬁned fromW and D. We ﬁrst deﬁne the Borel and the difference hierarchies over
an arbitrary topological space, in a way that is appropriate for our purposes.
Borel hierarchies are usually deﬁned over topological spaces whose closed sets are countable intersections of open
sets. This condition will not be satisﬁed when D is not semantically closed under negation (in particular, when P
represents a learning paradigm where learning is from positive data only). So slight adjustments are needed in order to
deﬁne Borel hierarchies over more general topological spaces, and can be described as follows. Let a set X and a set
B of subsets of X be given. When we consider the topology over X generated by B, yielding a topological space X ,
we call the sets built from B by ﬁnite unions and ﬁnite intersections, the 0 Borel sets of X . Their complements are
the 0 Borel sets of X . Let  > 0 be given. The  Borel sets of X are built from the  Borel sets of X , with  < ,
by countable unions. Their complements are the Borel sets of X . Subsets of X that are both  and Borel in X
are said to be  Borel in X .
For instance, suppose that X = {0, 1}N and B is the set of all sets of the form {c ∈ {0, 1}N : c(i) = 1} where i
ranges over N.
• {c ∈ {0, 1}N : c(0) = 1 and c(2) = 1} is0 Borel in X , but not 0 Borel in X ; it is represented in Fig. 2 by the two
rightmost fans.
• {c ∈ {0, 1}N : c(0) = 0 and c(1) = 0 and c(2) = 0} is 0 Borel in X , but not 0 Borel in X ; it is represented in
Fig. 2 by the leftmost fan.
• {c ∈ {0, 1}N : c(0) = 0 and c(1) = 1} is 2 Borel in X , but neither 1 nor1 Borel in X ; it is represented in Fig. 2
by the second fan from the left.
The difference hierarchy introduces a further granularity in the Borel hierarchy.More precisely, every nonnull ordinal
 determines a difference hierarchy, built from the  and Borel sets ofX ; this hierarchy consists of sets that are all
+1 Borel in X , and is usually deﬁned in terms of ⊆-increasing chains of  Borel sets of X (see [11]). Fig. 3 depicts
a ,4 and a ,5 Borel set, that are both members of the difference hierarchy built from the  and  Borel sets of










Fig. 2. 1, 1, and 2 Borel sets for some topology over {0, 1}N.
114 É. Martin et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 350 (2006) 103–124
Fig. 3. ,4 and ,5 Borel sets.
 Borel sets of X of length 4; the latter is represented as the crosshatched part of the diagram on the right that shows
a ⊆-increasing sequence of  Borel sets of X of length 5.
The natural way to introduce the difference hierarchy in this framework is as follows.
Deﬁnition 25. Let a nonnull ordinal , a topological space X over a set X, and a subset Z of X be given.
We say that Z is ,1 Borel in X iff Z is  Borel in X .
Given an ordinal  > 1, we say that Z is , Borel inX iff there exists two families (Ai)i∈N and (Zi)i∈N of subsets
of X and a family (i )i∈N of nonnull ordinals smaller than  such that the following holds:
• For all i ∈ N, Ai is  Borel in X and Zi is ,i Borel in X .• For all i, i′ ∈ N and x ∈ Ai ∩ Ai′ , x ∈ Zi iff x ∈ Zi′ .
• Z =⋃i∈N (Ai \ Zi).
Given a nonnull ordinal , we say that Z is , Borel in X iff X \ Z is , Borel in X .
Given a nonnull ordinal , we say that Z is , Borel in X iff Z is both , and , Borel in X .
The previous deﬁnition is equivalent to the classical deﬁnition of the difference hierarchy over the  Borel sets of
X for a given  > 0, as we now show.
Proposition 26. Let a topological spaceX over a set X be given. For all nonnull  ∈ Ord, nonnull countable  ∈ Ord
and Z ⊆ X, Z is , Borel in X iff there exists a ⊆-increasing sequence (Y)< of  Borel sets of X with the
following property. For all x ∈ X, x ∈ Z iff x ∈⋃< Y and the parity of the least  <  such that x ∈ Y is opposite
to the parity of .
Proof. Proof is by induction on ordinals. Let a nonnull  ∈ Ord and a nonnull countable  ∈ Ord be given. Suppose
that for all nonnull ′, ′ ∈ Ord with (′, ′) < (, ) and for all Z ⊆ X, if Z is ′,′ Borel in X then there exists
a ⊆-increasing sequence (Y)<′ of ′ Borel sets of X such that for all x ∈ X, x ∈ Z iff x ∈
⋃
<′ Y and the parity
of the least ordinal  < ′ such that x ∈ Y is opposite to the parity of ′. Let Z ⊆ X be , Borel in X . Suppose
that  = 1. Let Y0 = Z. Then (Y)< is a ⊆-increasing sequence of  Borel sets of X , for all x ∈ X, x ∈ Z iff
x ∈ ⋃< Y and the parity of the least  <  such that x ∈ Y is opposite to the parity of . Suppose that  > 1. Let
(Ai)i∈N be a family of  Borel sets of X , let (i )i∈N be a family of nonnull ordinals smaller than , and let (Zi)i∈N
be a family of subsets of X such that
• for all i ∈ N, Zi is ,i Borel in X ,• for all i, j ∈ N and x ∈ Ai ∩ Aj , x ∈ Zi iff x ∈ Zj ,
• Z =⋃i∈N(Ai ∩ Zi).
Without loss of generality, we can assume that
• if  = + 1 for some ordinal , then i =  for all i ∈ N,
• if  is a limit ordinal, then i is odd for all i ∈ N.
By inductive hypothesis, for all i ∈ N we can choose a ⊆-increasing sequence (Yi,)<i of  subsets of X such that
for all x ∈ X, x /∈ Zi iff x ∈ ⋃<i Yi, and the parity of the least ordinal  < i such that x ∈ Yi, is opposite to the
parity of i . For all ordinals  < , deﬁne
Y =
⋃
{Ai : i ∈ N, i} ∪
⋃
{Ai ∩ Yi, : i ∈ N,  < i}.
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Clearly, (Y)< is a ⊆-increasing sequence of  Borel sets of X . Let x ∈ X be given. Assume that x ∈ Z. Choose
p ∈ N such that x ∈ Ap ∩ Zp. Note that x ∈ Yp . Let  be the least ordinal smaller than  such that x ∈ Y. We
distinguish two cases.
Case 1: There exists q ∈ N such that  < q and x ∈ Aq ∩ Yq,. By the choice of ,  is the least ordinal ′ < q
such that x ∈ Yq,′ . Moreover, the fact that x ∈ (Ap ∩ Zp) ∪ Aq implies that x ∈ Zq . We infer that  and q have the
same parity. Hence  and  have opposite parities.
Case 2: For all i ∈ N such that  < i , x /∈ Ai ∩ Yi,. Since x ∈ Y, we infer that  is equal to i for some i ∈ N.
Hence  and  have opposite parities.
Now assume that x ∈⋃< Y, denote by  the least ordinal smaller than  such that x ∈ Y, and assume that  and
 have opposite parities. Clearly, we can choose p ∈ N such that x ∈ Ap. We distinguish two cases again.
Case 1: x /∈⋃′<p Yp,′ . Then x ∈ Zp, and we infer that x belongs to Z.
Case 2: x ∈⋃′<p Yp,′ . By the choice of ,  is the least ordinal ′ < p such that x ∈ Yp,′ . Since  and p have
the same parity, x ∈ Zp, and we infer that x belongs to Z.
So we have veriﬁed that for all x ∈ X, x ∈ Z iff x ∈ ⋃< Y and the parity of the least  <  such that x ∈ Y is
opposite to the parity of .
Conversely, suppose that for all nonnull ′, ′ ∈ Ord with (′, ′) < (, ) and for all Z ⊆ X, if there exists
a ⊆-increasing sequence (Y)<′ of ′ Borel sets of X such that for all x ∈ X, x ∈ Z iff x ∈
⋃
<′ Y and the parity
of the least  < ′ such that x ∈ Y is opposite to the parity of ′, then Z is′,′ Borel inX . Let a subset Z of X and let
a ⊆-increasing sequence (Y)< of  Borel sets ofX be such that for all x ∈ X, x ∈ Z iff x ∈
⋃
< Y and the parity
of the least  <  such that x ∈ Y is opposite to the parity of . If  = 1 then it is immediately veriﬁed that Z is ,
Borel in X , so suppose that  > 1. Let (Ai)i∈N be an enumeration of {Y :  < ,  and  have opposite parities}. For
all i ∈ N, let Zi = Ai \Z. Clearly, Z =⋃i∈N Ai \Zi . Obviously, for all i, j ∈ N and x ∈ Ai ∩Aj , x ∈ Zi iff x ∈ Zj .
Moreover, for all i ∈ N, Ai is  Borel in X . So to complete the proof of the proposition, it sufﬁces to show that for all
i ∈ N, Zi is , Borel in X for some nonnull  < . Let i ∈ N be given. Let  <  be such that  and  have opposite
parities and Ai = Y. Let x ∈ X be given. Suppose that x ∈ Zi . So x ∈ Y. Since x /∈ Z, the parity of the least ′ < 
such that x ∈ Y′ is equal to the parity of  . Together with the fact that  and  have opposite parities, this implies that
x ∈ Y′ for some ′ <  and the parity of the least ordinal ′ <  such that x ∈ Y′ is opposite to the parity of . Suppose
that x /∈ Zi . If x ∈ Y then x ∈ Ai , hence x ∈ Z, and the parity of the least ′ such that x ∈ Y′ is opposite to the
parity of , hence equal to the parity of . So we infer that x ∈ Zi iff x ∈ Y′ for some ′ <  and the parity of the least
′ <  such that x ∈ Y′ is opposite to the parity of . By inductive hypothesis, this implies thatZi is, Borel inX , and
we are done. 
4.2. Relations between logical and topological complexity
Some topological space is closely related to the logical notions introduced in the ﬁrst part of the paper. It is deﬁned
as follows.
Deﬁnition 27. We denote by W the topological space overW generated by all sets of the form ModW() where 
ranges over D.
To relate the logical hierarchies to the Borel and to the difference hierarchies over W, we examine how a  or a
, Borel set of W can be represented by a sentence. Let a nonnull ordinal , a subset X ofW such that X is  Borel
in W, and a sentence  be given. For  to represent X, it is not enough that the set of models of  inW be precisely
equal to X. What is needed is a hereditary representation of X. It should be possible to write X as the countable union
of a family (Xi)i∈N of subsets ofW, each of which is  Borel in W for some  < , in such a way that each set
Xi , i ∈ N, is itself the set of models inW of some sentence. In other words, it should possible to obtain X from the
generators of the topology using countable disjunctions and conjunctions, in such a way that the resulting representation
of X can be mapped to a sentence with members ofD replacing the generators of the topology, countable disjunctions
replacing countable unions, and countable conjunctions replacing countable intersections. These considerations lead
to the following deﬁnition.
Deﬁnition 28. Let a sentence  be given.
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We say that  is L0 | L0  Borel in W iff ModW() is 0 | 0 Borel in W.
Let a nonnull ordinal  be given. We say that  is L | L  Borel in W iff there exists a set X of sentences each
of which is L | L  Borel in W for some  <  such that  is logically equivalent inW to 
∨
X | ∧X.
Given an ordinal , we say that  is L Borel in W iff  is both L Borel and L Borel in W.
The same considerations apply mutatis mutandis to the notion of a sentence representing a , Borel set
of W.
Deﬁnition 29. Let a nonnull ordinal  and a sentence  be given.
We say that  is L,1 | L,1 Borel in W iff  is L | L  Borel in W.
Given  ∈ Ord greater than 1, we say that  is L, | L, Borel in W iff there exists two families (	i )i∈N and
(i )i∈N of sentences and a family (i )i∈N of nonnull ordinals smaller than  such that the following holds:
• For all i ∈ N, 	i is L | L  Borel in W.
• For all i ∈ N, i is L,i | 
L
,i
 Borel in W.
• For all i, j ∈ N, 	i ∧ 	j Wi ↔ j .
•  is logically equivalent inW to ∨i∈N(	i ∧ i ) |
∧
i∈N(	i ∨ i ).
Given a nonnull ordinal , we say that  is L, Borel in W iff  is 
L
, Borel and 
L
, Borel in W.
The proof of the property that follows is immediate, by induction on the complexity of Borel sets. The corollary to
the property plays an essential role in the proofs of the forthcoming propositions.
Property 30. Let a sentence  be such that ModW() is a Borel set of W. Then every possible knowledge base
D-minimally decides  inW.
Corollary 31. For all sentences , if  isL-Borel in W then every possible knowledge base D-minimally decides 
inW.
The result that follows expresses that topological complexity is a reﬁnement of logical complexity.
Proposition 32. Let nonnull ordinals ,  and a sentence  be given. Assume that  is L, | L, | L, Borel in
W. Then  is P, | P, | P,.
Proof. Proof is by double induction on ordinals. Let nonnull ordinals ,  be given, and assume that for all nonnull












Let  be a sentence that is L, Borel in W. To complete the proof of the proposition, it sufﬁces to show that  is 
P
,.
Suppose that  = 1. Then ModW() is equal to ModW(
∨{	 : 	 ∈ X}) for some set X of sentences each of which is
L0 Borel in W or
L
′,1 Borel in W for some nonnull 
′ < , and it follows easily from Corollary 31 and the inductive
hypothesis that  is P,. So suppose that  > 1. For all i ∈ N, let a sentence 	i , a nonnull ordinal i < , and a
sentence i be such that the following holds:
• For all i ∈ N, 	i is L Borel in W and i is L,i Borel in W.• For all i, i′ ∈ N, 	i ∧ 	i′ Wi ↔ i′ .
• W ↔
∨
i∈N (	i ∧ i ).
Let T ∈ B be such that T DW. By Corollary 31, we can choose p ∈ N such that T DW	p ∧ p. By inductive
hypothesis, 	p is P and p is P,p . Since 	p is 
P
 , Lemma 24 implies that there exists a ﬁnite K ⊆ T and a ﬁnite
H ⊆⋃(′,′)<(,0) 
P′,′(T ) such that for all T ′ ∈ B:







(2) if K ⊆ T ′ and H ⊆ CnDW(T ′) then 	p ∈ CnDW(T ′).
É. Martin et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 350 (2006) 103–124 117
Let B′ = {T ′ ∈ B : K ⊆ T ′ and H ⊆ CnDW(T ′)}. We prove that
(∗) For all T ′ ∈ B′ and for all ′ ∈ Ord, p ∈ 
P,′(T ′) iff  ∈ 
P,′(T ′), and ¬p ∈ 





Let a member T ′ of B′ be given. So T ′ DW	p by 2. Assume that T ′ DW. By Corollary 31 again, we can choose
q ∈ N such that T ′ DW	q ∧ q . Since 	q ∧ 	p Wq ↔ p, we infer that T ′ DWp. Conversely, if T ′ DWp then
T ′ DW
∨
i∈N(	i ∧ i ), hence T ′ DW. So we have shown that T ′ DW iff T ′ DWp, and equivalently T ′ DW¬
iff T ′ DW¬p. It is then easy to verify (∗) by induction on ′. Let T ′ ∈ B be such that T ′  DW. Then T ′ DW¬p,




(T ). We conclude that  is P,, as wanted. 
ByCorollary 31, the converse of Proposition 32 can only be established for sentences that areD-minimally decided in
W by every possible knowledge base. It turns out that no further condition is necessary to prove that logical complexity
and topological complexity are equivalent notions. This result will easily follow from the next lemma.
Lemma 33. Suppose that D = ∅. Let a nonnull ordinal , an ordinal , a trace , and a sentence  be such that the
height bound of  is smaller than (, 0),  is from a member of B, and   ((, ,)) belongs to D. Let H be the set
of sentences that occur in .
• ∧H is L Borel in W.
• If  = 0 then H W. If  > 0 then H W ↔  for some sentence  that is L, Borel in W.
Proof. Proof is by double induction on ordinals. Given a trace  in D, denote by H the set of sentences occurring in
. Let a nonnull ordinal  and an ordinal  be given. Assume that for all nonnull ′ ∈ Ord, ′ ∈ Ord, traces ′ and
sentences ′, if (′, ′) < (, ), the height bound of ′ is smaller than (′, 0), ′  ((′, ′,′)) belongs to D, and ′
is from a member of B then the following holds.
• ∧H′ is L′ Borel in W.
• If ′ = 0 then H′ W′. If ′ > 0 then H′ W′ ↔  for some sentence  that is L′,′ Borel in W.
Let a trace  and a sentence  be such that the height bound of  is smaller than (, 0),  is from a member of B,
and   ((, ,)) belongs to D. Without loss of generality, we can assume that all sentences in D and all sentences
occurring in  are closed. We ﬁrst verify that
∧
H is L Borel in W. If the height bound of  is equal to 0, then
H ⊆ D, and∧H is trivially L Borel in W. Suppose that the height bound of  is equal to (′, ′) for some nonnull
′ ∈ Ord and ′ ∈ Ord. Let ′ be the largest initial segment of  whose height bound is smaller than (′, 0). Let trace
′′ be such that  = ′ ′′. It follows from the inductive hypothesis that for all sentences 	 that occur in ′′,∧H′ ∧	
is L Borel in W. So
∧
H is logically equivalent to a ﬁnite conjunction of sentences that are L Borel in W, hence
is L Borel in W.
Let X be the set of all traces  whose height bound is smaller than (, 0), that are from a member ofB, such that all
sentences occurring in  are closed, and such that  ((, ,¬)) belongs toD for some  <  (for later, note that  can
be assumed to be nonnull whenever  > 1). Let Y = {∧H ∧ ¬ :  ∈ X}. We show that H W ↔ ¬
∨
Y . (Note
that in case  = 0, this yields H W.) For a contradiction, chooseM ∈W such thatMH∪{¬
∨
Y,¬}. Using
Corollary 31 together with the hypothesis that D = ∅, the derived fact that∧H isL-Borel in W, and the choice of
M as a model of H, it can be easily derived that  is from DiagD(M). Hence by Lemma 23, there exists a trace  and
 <  such that   ((, ,¬)) is a derivation from DiagD(M) inD. Then
∧
H ∧ ¬ ∈ Y , henceM¬∧H ∨ .
But M   by the choice of M, and M  ¬∧H since  is from DiagD(M), contradiction. Conversely, it is clear
that if M is a model of H ∪ {} then M is a model of ¬∨Y . So we have shown that H W ↔ ¬
∨
Y . Now
assume that  > 0. To complete the proof of the lemma, it sufﬁces to show that
∨
Y is L, Borel in W.We distinguish
two cases.
Case 1:  = 1. By inductive hypothesis, for all  ∈ X,∧H is L Borel in W and W(
∧
H ∧ ¬) ↔∧H. It
follows immediately that
∨
Y is L Borel in W.
Case 2:  > 1. By inductive hypothesis, for all  ∈ X, ∧H is L Borel in W and there exists a sentence
 and a nonnull  <  such that  is L, Borel in W and H W¬ ↔ . Moreover, for all , ′ ∈ X and
118 É. Martin et al. / Theoretical Computer Science 350 (2006) 103–124
M ∈ ModW(H ∪ H′), M  iff M¬ iff M ′ . Also note that W
∨
Y ↔ ∨{∧H ∧  :  ∈ X}. We
conclude immediately that
∨
Y is L, Borel in W. 
We are now in a position to formulate one of the main results of the paper, and prove that logical and topological
complexity are equivalent notions, when applied to sentences that are D-minimally decided inW by every possible
knowledge base.
Proposition 34. Let a sentence  beD-minimally decided inW by every member ofB. For all nonnull ordinals , ,
the following are equivalent:
•  is P, | P, | P,.
•  is L, | L, | L, Borel in W.
Proof. Let nonnull ,  ∈ Ord be given. By Proposition 32, the second clause implies the ﬁrst one. Let P′ =
(V,L,W,D,∅). Property 15 implies that if  is P, then  is P
′
,. Hence in order to prove that the ﬁrst clause of
the proposition implies the second one, we can without loss of generality assume that D = ∅. So suppose that D = ∅
and  is P,. Let X be the set of all possible knowledge bases T such that T 
D
W. Given T ∈ X, choose a trace T
from T and an ordinal  <  such that the height bound of  is smaller than (, 0) and T  ((, ,)) ∈ D. For all
T ∈ X, let HT denote the set of sentences that occur in T . Let 	 =∨{∧HT ∧ : T ∈ X}. It is immediately veriﬁed
that W ↔ 	. Let a member T of B be given. By Lemma 33,
∧
HT is L Borel in W and there exists a sentence
T and a nonnull ordinal  <  such that T is L, Borel in W and HT W ↔ T . Clearly, for all T , T ′ ∈ X and
M ∈ ModW(HT ∪ HT ′),M T iffM iffM T ′ . Note that W	 ↔
∨{∧HT ∧ T : T ∈ X}. It follows that
 is L, Borel in W. 
5. Connections with Inductive inference
5.1. Basic notions
The basic concepts from Inductive inference are immediately adapted to the present framework. The notion of
classiﬁcation which is deﬁned next is, in the absence of computability requirements, more fundamental than the notion
of identiﬁcation in the limit. As usual, it uses a symbol  whose intended meaning is ‘no datum presented.’
Deﬁnition 35. A classiﬁer (for P) is a partial function from (L ∪ {}) into {0, 1}.
It is convenient to talk about consistent inW not only for sets of sentences, but also for members of (L ∪ {}).
Given a member  of (L ∪ {}), we denote by cnt() the set of members ofL that occur in .
Deﬁnition 36. We say that a member  of (L ∪ {}) is consistent inW just in case there exists a possible worldM
such thatM cnt().
Suppose that A is empty. Depending on the choice of D, the enumeration of a possible knowledge base (with 
possibly occurring in the enumeration), i.e., the enumeration of theD-diagram of a possible world, can correspond to a
text, or to an informant, or have no counterpart in Inductive inference.More generally, wewant to consider enumerations
of possible knowledge bases that, in caseA is not included inD, also go beyond the enumerations of data considered
in Inductive inference. We use environment as a general term for an enumeration of a possible knowledge base.
Deﬁnition 37. Given a member T ofB, an environment for T is any member e of (L∪{})N such that for all  ∈L,
 occurs in e iff  belongs to T .
The concept of classiﬁcation is deﬁned as follows.
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Deﬁnition 38. Let a sentence  and a classiﬁer f be given.
We say that f positively classiﬁes B in the limit following  (in P) just in case for all T ∈ B and environments e
for T :
• T DW iff {k ∈ N : f (e|k) = 1} is coﬁnite.
• If {k ∈ N : f (e|k) = 0} is coﬁnite then T DW¬.
We say that f negatively classiﬁes B in the limit following  (in P) just in case for all T ∈ B and environments e
for T :
• T DW¬ iff {k ∈ N : f (e|k) = 0} is coﬁnite.
• If {k ∈ N : f (e|k) = 1} is coﬁnite then T DW.
We say that f classiﬁes B in the limit following  (in P) just in case f positively and negatively classiﬁes B in the
limit following .
The concept of classiﬁcation with a bounded number of mind changes is captured by the following deﬁnition. The
usual notion of mind change complexity considers the least ordinal  such that at most, rather than less than,  mind
changes are sometimes necessary for the procedure to converge [2,1,7]. Note that if  is a limit ordinal, then converging
after at most  mind changes can mean either converging after less than  mind changes, or converging after less
than  + 1 mind changes. So the ‘less than’ formulation is more precise than the ‘at most’ formulation. But more
fundamentally, the ‘less than’ formulation is justiﬁed by the propositions in this part of the paper, which elegantly and
simply relate classiﬁcation with less than mind changes to the logical and topological notions investigated in the ﬁrst
two parts of the paper.
Deﬁnition 39. Let a nonnull ordinal , a sentence , and a classiﬁer f be given.
Let X be the set of all  ∈ (D ∪A ∪ {}) such that  is consistent inW and f () =↓ for some initial segment  of
. We denote by Rf the binary relation over X such that for all ,  ∈ X, Rf (, ) holds iff  ⊂  and f () = f ().
We say that f  positively classiﬁes | negatively classiﬁes | classiﬁesB with less than  mind changes following 
(inP) just in case the length of Rf is deﬁned and smaller than or equal to , and f  positively classiﬁes | negatively
classiﬁes | classiﬁes B in the limit following .
Finally, we derive some more terminology from Deﬁnitions 38 and 39.
Deﬁnition 40. Let a sentence  be given.
We say that B is  positively classiﬁable | negatively classiﬁable | classiﬁable in the limit following  (in P) iff
some classiﬁer  positively classiﬁes | negatively classiﬁes | classiﬁes B in the limit following .
Given a nonnull ordinal , we say thatB is  positively classiﬁable | negatively classiﬁable | classiﬁable with less
than  mind changes following  (inP) iff some classiﬁer  positively classiﬁes | negatively classiﬁes | classiﬁesB
with less than  mind changes following .
When  = 1, we also say ‘no mind change’ rather than ‘less than  mind changes’ in the previous expressions.
Remember that given a classiﬁer f and ,  ∈ (L ∪ {}), f () = f () whenever f () =↑ or f () =↑. The next
property follows immediately from this observation together with Deﬁnition 39.
Property 41. Let T ∈ B,  ∈ L, a nonnull ordinal , an environment e for T , and a classiﬁer f be such that
f  positively classiﬁes | negatively classiﬁes | classiﬁesB with less than mind changes following , and f () =↓
for some  ⊂ e. Then either T DW and {k ∈ N : f (e|k) = 1} is ﬁnite, or T DW¬ and {k ∈ N : f (e|k) = 0} isﬁnite.
The usual notion of locking sequence and associated lemma obviously take the following form in this framework.
Deﬁnition 42. Given a possible knowledge base T and a classiﬁer f , a member  of (L ∪ {}) is said to be a locking
sequence for f and T iff cnt() ⊆ T and for all  ∈ (T ∪ {}), f (  ) = f ().
Lemma 43. Let a classiﬁer f and a member T of B be given. Suppose that for every environment e for T , {k ∈ N :
f (e|k) = f (e|k+1)} is ﬁnite. Then for all  ∈ (T ∪ {}), there exists a locking sequence for f and T that extends .
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5.2. Relations between logical complexity and learnability
In Inductive inference, the set of possible realities is usually countable (for instance, when it is the set of all recursively
enumerable languages). This is to be contrasted with the fact thatW or even B, is usually noncountable. When B is
countable, it is easy to obtain a characterization of classiﬁcation in the limit that generalizes Angluin’s ﬁnite telltale
characterization of learnability in the limit [3].
Proposition 44. Suppose thatB is countable. Let a sentence be given. ThenB is  positively classiﬁable | negatively
classiﬁable in the limit following  iff for all T ∈ B with  ∈ CnDW(T ) | ¬ ∈ CnDW(T ), there exists a ﬁnite subset
K of T such that
() for all T ′ ∈ B, if K ⊆ T ′ ⊆ T then  ∈ CnDW(T ′) | ¬ ∈ CnDW(T ′).
Proof. Let a classiﬁer f be such that f positively classiﬁesB in the limit following . Let T be a possible knowledge
base such that T DW. By Lemma 43, choose a member  of (T ∪ {}) such that for all  ∈ (T ∪ {}) that extend
, f () = 1. Let T ′ ∈ B with cnt() ⊆ T ′ ⊆ T be given. Choose an environment e for T ′ that begins with . Since
T ′ ⊆ T , f (e|k) = 1 for all k ∈ N at least equal to the length of . Since f positively classiﬁesB in the limit following
, we infer that  ∈ CnDW(T ′).
Conversely, suppose that condition () holds. If /∈ CnDW(T ) for all T ∈ B, thenB is trivially positively classiﬁable
in the limit following, so suppose otherwise. Fix an enumeration (Ti)i∈N of all T ∈ B such that ∈ CnDW(T ). Given
i ∈ N, denote by Ki a ﬁnite subset of Ti such that for all T ∈ B, if Ki ⊆ T ⊆ Ti then  ∈ CnDW(T ). Deﬁne a classiﬁer
f as follows. Let f (()) =↑. Let  ∈ (L ∪ {}) be given, and suppose that f () has been deﬁned. Let x ∈ L ∪ {}
be given. If there is no i ∈ N with Ki ⊆ cnt(  x) ⊆ Ti , then f (  x) =↑. Suppose otherwise, and let i be the least
j ∈ N such that Kj ⊆ cnt(  x) ⊆ Tj . If i is the least j ∈ N such that Kj ⊆ cnt() ⊆ Tj , then f (  x) = 1;
otherwise f (  x) =↑. We show that f positively classiﬁesB in the limit following . Let a possible knowledge base
T and an environment e for T be given. Suppose that  ∈ CnDW(T ). Choose i ∈ N with T = Ti . Let n ∈ N be such
that for all j i, if Kj ⊆ T then Kj ⊆ cnt(e|n), and if T ⊆ Tj then cnt(e|n) \ Tj = ∅. It is easy to verify that for
all k > n, f (e|k) = 1. Suppose that  /∈ CnDW(T ). To complete the proof of the proposition it sufﬁces to show that{k ∈ N : f (e|k) = 1} is inﬁnite. Let m ∈ N be given, and suppose that f (e|n) =↓ for some nm (if there is no such
n then we are done). By the deﬁnition of f , there is a least i ∈ N such that Ki ⊆ cnt(e|n) ⊆ Ti . Since  /∈ CnDW(T ),
it follows from the choice of Ki that T ⊆ Ti , hence there exists a least p > n such that i is not the least j ∈ N
with Kj ⊆ cnt(e|p) ⊆ Tj . With the deﬁnition of f , we infer that f (e|p) =↑. So {k ∈ N : f (e|k) = 1} is inﬁnite, as
wanted. 
Corollary 45. Suppose that B is countable. For all sentences , B is classiﬁable in the limit following  iff for all
T ∈ B that D-minimally decide  inW, there exists a ﬁnite subset K of T such that for all T ′ ∈ B:
if K ⊆ T ′ ⊆ T , then  ∈ CnDW(T ) iff  ∈ CnDW(T ′).
The next fundamental result shows that classiﬁcation with a bounded number of mind changes is perfectly charac-
terized by the property of -weak compactness on the basis of which the logical hierarchies are deﬁned. Note that no
assumption on P is needed; in particular, B can be uncountable.
Proposition 46. For all  ∈ Ord \ {0} and  ∈L, the following are equivalent:
•  is P1, | P1, | P1,.
• B is  positively classiﬁable | negatively classiﬁable | classiﬁable with less than  mind changes following .
Proof. Let a nonnull ordinal  and a sentence  be given. By Property 17, it sufﬁces to show that B is positively
classiﬁable with less than  mind changes following  iff the following holds:
(∗) There exists a subset B′ of B, a sequence (T )T ∈B′ of ordinals smaller than , and a sequence (KT )T ∈B′
of ﬁnite sets of sentences with the following properties:
(i) Every member of B′ D-minimally decides  inW.
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(ii) B′ contains all T ∈ B such that T DW.
(iii) For all T ∈ B′, KT ⊆ T .
(iv) Let T ∈ B and T ′ ∈ B′ be such that KT ′ ⊆ T . Then T ∈ B′. Moreover, T ′T implies that  ∈ CnDW(T )
iff  ∈ CnDW(T ′).
Let f be a classiﬁer that positively classiﬁesBwith less than mind changes following. LetB′ be the set of all T ∈ B
such that there exists  ∈ (T ∪ {}) with f () =↓. Given T ∈ B′, let T be the least ordinal  <  such that there
exists  ∈ (T ∪ {}) with Rf () = , and either f () = 1 and T DW or f () = 0 and T DW¬. By Property 41
and the choice of f , conditions (i) and (ii) in (∗) clearly hold, and (T )T ∈B′ is well deﬁned. Let T ∈ B′ be given.
Suppose without loss of generality that T DW. Choose T ∈ (T ∪ {}) such that Rf (T ) = T and f (T ) = 1.
Suppose that there exists T ′ ∈ B such that cnt(T ) ⊆ T ′, T T ′ , and T ′  DW. Choose an environment e for T ′
that begins with T . By Property 41 again, T ′ DW¬ and there is a k ∈ N greater than the length of T such that
f (e|k) = 0. But we then infer that Rf (e|k) < Rf (T )T ′ , which contradicts the deﬁnition of T ′ . Hence conditions
(iii) and (iv) in (∗) hold if for all T ∈ B′, we take KT = cnt(T ). So we have shown that ifB is positively classiﬁable
with less than  mind changes following , then (∗) holds.
Conversely, assume that there exists a subset B′ of B, a sequence (T )T ∈B′ of ordinals smaller than , and a
sequence (KT )T ∈B′ of ﬁnite sets of sentences such that conditions (i)–(iv) in (∗) hold. Deﬁne a classiﬁer f as follows.
Let  ∈ (L ∪ {}) be given. Suppose that there exists a least ordinal  such that for some T ∈ B′, T =  and
KT ⊆ cnt(). Let T ∈ B′ be such that T =  and KT ⊆ cnt(). Then either T DW and f () = 1, or T DW¬
and f () = 0. If such an ordinal  does not exist, then f () =↑. Clause (iv) in (∗) implies immediately that f is
well deﬁned. It is easy to verify that the length of Rf is deﬁned and smaller than . So to complete the proof of the
proposition, it sufﬁces to show that f positively classiﬁes B in the limit following . Let T ∈ B and an environment
e for T be given. If T /∈ B′ then it is easily veriﬁed using (iv) that f (e|k) =↑ for all k ∈ N. Suppose that T ∈ B′.
Choose k ∈ N such that KT ⊆ cnt(e|k). Clause (iv) again then implies that f (e|k′) = f (e|k) for all k′k, f (e|k) = 1
if T DW, and f (e|k) = 0 otherwise. Together with clauses (i) and (ii), this implies that f positively classiﬁes B in
the limit following , as wanted. 
We now examine the connections between classiﬁcation in the limit and the logical hierarchies. One direction
complements one half of Proposition 46, also with no assumption on P.
Proposition 47. For all sentences, if is P2 |P2 |P2  thenB is  positively classiﬁable | negatively classiﬁable |
classiﬁable in the limit following .
Proof. Let a sentence  be P2 . Let (i )i∈N\{0} be an enumeration of all derivations of  inD whose height bound is
equal to (2, 0) at most. Given a nonnull i ∈ N, denote byKi the ﬁrst member of i (henceKi is a ﬁnite set of sentences).
Deﬁne a g : (L ∪ {}) → N as follows. Let  ∈ (L ∪ {}) be given. Suppose that there exists a least i > 0 such that
for some T ∈ B, Ki ⊆ cnt() ⊆ T and i is from T . Then g() = i. If there is no such i then g() = 0. Finally deﬁne
a classiﬁer f as follows. Let f (()) =↑. Let  ∈ (L ∪ {}) and x ∈ L ∪ {} be given. If g() = g(  x) > 0 then
f (  x) = 1; otherwise f (  x) =↑. We show that f positively classiﬁesB in the limit following . Let T ∈ B and
an environment e for T be given. It is easy to verify that if  ∈ CnDW(T ) then f (e|k) = 1 for coﬁnitely many k ∈ N.
Suppose that  /∈ CnDW(T ). To complete the proof it sufﬁces to show that for all i > 0, there exists k ∈ N such that for
all k′k and T ′ ∈ B, either Ki ⊆ cnt(e|k′), or cnt(e|k′) ⊆ T ′, or i is not from T ′. So let a nonnull i ∈ N be given.
Suppose that Ki ⊆ T and i is from some member ofB (otherwise, we are done). Clearly there exists	 ∈L, H ⊆L,
and a nonnull  ∈ Ord such that 	 ∈ H , (1, , H) occurs in i , and 	 /∈ CnDW(T ).We can then choose a derivation  of¬	 inD such that  is from T and the height bound of  is at least equal to (1, 0) and smaller than (1, ). Let K denote
the ﬁrst member of . Let k ∈ N be such that K ∪ Ki ⊆ cnt(e|k). Then for all k′k and T ′ ∈ B, either cnt(e|k′) ⊆ T ′
or ¬	 ∈ CnDW(T ′). We conclude that for all k′k and T ′ ∈ B, either cnt(e|k′) ⊆ T ′ or i is not from T ′, as
wanted. 
Proposition 47 can be used to provide an easy proof that ifD = ∅, then all logical hierarchies collapse to the ﬁrst layer
of the ﬁrst level. We noted that when P is the paradigm of classical ﬁrst-order logic, this result follows immediately
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from the compactness theorem. If D = ∅, the notion T DW—equivalent to  ∈ ModW(T )—is not necessarily
compact, but still cannot be stratiﬁed on the basis of the property of -weak compactness.
Proposition 48. Suppose that D = ∅. For all sentences , if B is  positively classiﬁable | negatively classiﬁable |
classiﬁable in the limit following , thenB is  positively classiﬁable | negatively classiﬁable | classiﬁable with no
mind change following .
Proof. Let a sentence  and a classiﬁer f be such that f positively classiﬁes B in the limit following . Let T ∈ B
be such that T DW. By Lemma 43, choose a locking sequence  ∈ (T ∪ {}) for f and T . SinceD = ∅, cnt() is a
member of B and ModDW(cnt()) = ModW(cnt()), which together with the choice of , implies that cnt()W.
It follows immediately that  ∈ 
P1,0(T ), and we conclude with Proposition 46 that B is positively classiﬁable with
no mind change following . 
Directly from Propositions 47 and 48:
Proposition 49. If D = ∅ then for all T ∈ B,⋃,∈Ord\{0} 
P,(T ) = 
P1,0(T ).
Our last task for this paper is to investigate the converse of Proposition 47. Basically, the converse holds provided
that the language is rich enough. So given a sentence , if  is positively classiﬁable in the limit following , then 
might not be P2 ; but it is possible to enrichL with a countable set of closed inﬁnitary statements, resulting in a new
paradigmP′, such that  is P′2 . The next proposition also shows how the topological notions deﬁned in Section 4 can
be used to naturally characterize classiﬁcation in the limit.
Proposition 50. For all countable fragments L ofLV1, there exists a countable fragment L′ ofLV1 that extends
L with the following property. Suppose thatL is the set of closed members of L′. For all sentences , the three clauses
below are equivalent:
•  is P2 | P2 .• B is  positively classiﬁable | negatively classiﬁable in the limit following .
• For all T ∈ B with  ∈ CnDW(T ) | ¬ ∈ CnDW(T ), there exists ﬁnite K ⊆ T and  ∈L such that T DW,  is
L1 Borel in W and for all T ′ ∈ B:
if K ⊆ T ′ and T ′ DW then  ∈ CnDW(T ′) | ¬ ∈ CnDW(T ′).
Proof. By Proposition 47, the ﬁrst clause in the statement of the proposition implies the second one. By Proposition 32,
the third clause implies the ﬁrst one. Let a classiﬁer f be such that f positively classiﬁesB in the limit following . To
complete the proof of the proposition, it sufﬁces to exhibit a countable set Z of closed inﬁnitary statements such that
ifL′ is the set of closed members of the countable fragment ofLV1 generated byL ∪ Z, then the following holds:
• All members of Z are L′1 Borel in W.
• For all T ∈ B with T DW, either  ∈ 
P1,0(T ) or there exists a ﬁnite K ⊆ T and  ∈ Z such that for all T ′ ∈ B:
if K ⊆ T ′ and T ′ DW then T ′ DW.
Let X be the set of all  ∈ (L ∪ {}) that are locking sequences for f and some possible knowledge base. We can
assume that X = ∅ (otherwise, it follows from Lemma 43 that T  DW for all T ∈ B, and the result is trivial). Given





cnt(). Deﬁne Z as {	 :  ∈ X, X = ∅}. Clearly, every member of Z is L
′
1 Borel in W. Let
L′ be the set of closed members of the countable fragment ofLV1 generated byL ∪ Z. Let T ∈ B be such that
T DW. By Lemma 43, let  ∈ X be a locking sequence for f and T . So cnt() is a ﬁnite subset of T . If X = ∅,
then it is immediately veriﬁed that  is aD-minimal logical consequence inW of every possible knowledge base that
contains cnt(), which implies that  ∈ 
P1,0(T ). Assume that X = ∅. Obviously, T DW	. Let T ′ ∈ B be such that
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cnt() ⊆ T ′ and T ′ DW	. To complete the proof of the proposition, it sufﬁces to show that T ′ DW. Suppose for
a contradiction that T ′  DW. Let T ′′ = cnt() ∪ (T ′ ∩D). Since T ′ and T ′′ have the same D-diagram, T ′ ⊆ T ′′,
and using the fact that 	 is L
′
1 Borel in W, it is easily veriﬁed that T ′′ DW	 and T ′′  DW. Let e be a member
of (D ∪ {})N such that   e is an environment for T ′′. Since f positively classiﬁes B in the limit following , there
exists k ∈ N such that f (  e|k) = 1. Hence e|k ∈ X and T ′′ DW
∧
cnt(e|k). Hence T ′′  DW	. Contradiction. 
Corollary 51. For all countable fragments L ofLV1, there exists a countable fragment L′ ofLV1 that extends L
with the following property. Suppose thatL is the set of closed members of L′. For all sentences , the three clauses
below are equivalent:
•  is P2 .• B is classiﬁable in the limit following .
• For all T ∈ B thatD-minimally decide  inW, there exists a ﬁnite K ⊆ T and  ∈L such that T DW,  is L1
Borel in W, and for all T ′ ∈ B:
if K ⊆ T ′ and T ′ DW, then  ∈ CnDW(T ) iff  ∈ CnDW(T ′).
6. Conclusion
Though many connections have been established between logic, learning and topology, there has been no attempt
to unify the ﬁelds, or at least, part of them. Still the connections are tight and natural at a fundamental level, and can
result in a logic with parameters that needs topological notions for its early developments, and notions from learning
theory for interpretation and applicability. It is essential to observe the same kind of connection when the framework
presented here is cast in a computable setting that can also address complexity issues. This is work in progress, and
results have already been obtained in this direction, with relativizations of the properties that can be proved in the more
general setting at the heart of which is the notion of -weak compactness described in this paper.
One of our goals is to provide a theoretical foundation for a declarative programming language for applications in
Artiﬁcial intelligence, whose nature could be purely deductive or inductive, but more often, would combine deductive
and inductive aspects.Aprototype of a system—whose development is driven by the theoretical considerations presented
here— that employs such a programming language has been designed and implemented [16].
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